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From 2016 onwards, Albania has undertaken a profound reform in the 
judiciary, in order to increase public trust in it. During these 30 years of 
democratic transition, Albania has tried several times to reform the 
judiciary. This was targeted through organic laws that were adopted in the 
framework of the basic law “On the main constitutional provisions” 
(1991). In 1992, the Constitutional Court of Albania was established for 
the first time and the new organization completely separated the justice 
system from the tradition of “popular courts” during the monist regime 
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(1944-1990)2. This institutional reform was immediately accompanied by 
measures to replace former judges and prosecutors with new ones, who 
were going to be trained with short-term (6-month) courses. However, 
not many years later, the need to re-evaluate their knowledge turned into 
an emergency issue. In 1998, the Constitution of Albania was adopted and 
entered into force by popular referendum, establishing new provisions for 
the reconstruction of the judiciary. The new legislation on the organization 
of the judiciary and the prosecution in Albania was drafted on this basis. 
Simultaneously (1998-99), a reform of the re-evaluation of skills for judges 
was attempted, from which there were no changes in the composition of 
the courts. Practically, the assessment was carried out on the basis of the 
legislation in force3, in the form of a knowledge test for all judges with up 
to 10 years of work experience. However, the judges who were dismissed 
by the decision of the High Council of Justice, due to failing this test, were 
reinstated by the decision of the Constitutional Court, which concluded 
that “the evaluation of the exam result only, regardless of the work results of the judge 
and his theoretical and practical contribution in the legal field, is an unconstitutional 
stance that goes beyond the content of the Constitution”4.  
Successful formulas and ideas in the judiciary from the best constitutional 
experiences of European and American democracies, were received. The 
constitutions of consolidated democracies in Europe and the United 
                                                 
2 Law no.7561, 29.04.1992 “On some changes to the law no.7491, 29.04.1991 ‘On the 
main constitutional provisions’”.  
3 Law no. 8436, 28.12.1998, “On the organization of the Judiciary in the Republic of 
Albania” 
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States mostly influenced the constitution of 1998 in Albania. In addition, 
the system was drafted with international assistance, in particular the 
opinions of the “European Commission for Democracy through Law” 
(Venice Commission)5. In this frame a question is raised: Why is this 
reform necessary? Various studies argue that the judicial reforms are 
deemed a key element for the accession of Albania and the Western 
Balkans to the EU as a process mainly driven by EU assistance6. 
Meanwhile, the recent vetting law for judges and prosecutors in Albania is 
considered to have “vital importance for the political future of Albania, determining 
how quickly and expedite will be its accession path to the EU and how much credibility 
will be gained vis-à-vis the Albanian people over the judiciary system”7.  
However, the causes are found within the country and its judicial system, 
which is affected by various crises, such as corruption, corporatism and 
politicization of the judicial system8. Although the formulas were 
successfully realized, they were not fully appropriated in Albania, because 
of the problems the judiciary faces there. The new democratic formulas 
                                                 
5 See: The Venice Commission opinions on the respective draft constitutions. Select in 
website:  
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/documents/by_opinion.aspx?lang=EN  
6 Ardit Memeti, “Rule of law through judicial reform: A key to the EU accession of the Western 
Balkans”, published in: “Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2014 1(1), available at: 
http://unipub.uni-graz.at/cse/periodical/pageview/138917 
7 An Analysis of the Vetting Process in Albania. Policy Analysis - No. 01/2017; available at: 
http://www.legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Policy-Analysis-
An-Analysis-of-the-Vetting-Process-in-Albania.pdf 
8 Anti-Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of Southeast Europe, cited, footnote no. 2, pg.75-76; 
see also: A. Gashi, B. Musliu, “Justice System reform in Kosovo”, available at: http://kli-
ks.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Justice-reform-in-Kosovo-RAPORTI-FINAL-
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offered by post-communist constitutions failed, especially the self-
government of the judiciary. In Albania, “…the analysis points out that 
recognition and implementation of the ethics of judges and prosecutors is low…While in 
practice it is concluded that the system fails to ‘nail’ corrupt judges and prosecutors”9. 
The 2015 progress report of the European Union for Albania emphasized 
the following: “The functioning of the judicial system continues to be affected by a 
high degree of politicization and poor inter-institutional cooperation. The independence 
and impartiality of the High Court is still not fully guaranteed”10.  
Analyzing the problems faced by the judiciary shows that the crisis of the 
judiciary is also a crisis of democracy. The judiciary progress is closely 
linked to the implementation of the constitutional principles of the 
separation of power and guarantees of protection for human rights. The 
political interference and the judicial politicization affect the judicial 
system, weakening it. In addition, conflicts of interest and corruption cases 
have destabilized judicial effectiveness and public trust of the judiciary 
system.  
The years 2015 and 2016 we can call a “constitutional period”, from the 
point of view of the constitutionalist Bruce Ackerman, who distinguishes 
such a period from the periods of “ordinary politics”. The people were 
mobilized to support the justice reform enthusiastically. All political forces 
                                                 
9 An Analysis of the Vetting Process in Albania. Policy Analysis - No. 01/2017; available at: 
http://www.legalpoliticalstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Policy-Analysis-
An-Analysis-of-the-Vetting-Process-in-Albania.pdf 
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succumbed to this enthusiasm and despite the debates and disagreements 
gave different opinions on the progress of the reform and never expressed 
any complaint against the reform itself. However, this period lasted until 
the summer of 2016, after the approval of the constitutional amendments 
with 100% of the votes in the Parliament. Subsequently, differences in the 
attitudes of political forces showed the deep distrust among political 
forces. 
Further below we will focus on some aspects of the reform that is being 
carried out in Albania, based on the constitutional changes of 2016.  
 
 
2. The internationalization of the reforming process.  
When we talk about the internationalization of the process, we have in 
mind that the justice reform in Albania is a part of the so-called “European 
model” of justice reforms in Western Balkans11.  There is even a “Western 
Balkans model” of judicial reform of the countries undergoing European 
integration, which is part of the “European Union model”. In addition, 
analyzing the whole process of the reform, we can see that the 
international factor is present, and its role is relevant at all its stages of the 
                                                 
11 See: Anastasi, Aurela, Reforming the Justice System in the Western Balkans. 
Constitutional Concerns and Guarantees (June 19, 2018). Workshop No. 18, of the 10th 
World Congress of Constitutional Law (IACL-AIDC); 2018 SEOUL 18-22 June 2018, 
Available at 
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reform process, in both political and technical level. In this process, we 
clearly find four important phases:  
1. the analyzing of the situation and designing the strategy of the 
reform;  
2. designing draft laws and drafting, and consulting on the new 
legislation;  
3. approving the legislation with a broad political consensus;  
4. implementing the new legislation.  
The international factors seem to be not only external supporters but also 
internal, as part of the working groups of the reform, or as part of the 
institutions for implementing the reform. For example, experts of 
international missions in Albania were a part and co-head of the working 
groups for drafting legislation amendments for the judicial reform12. Thus, 
for example, high-level experts and technical experts were attached to the 
special parliamentary pluralist Commission for Justice Reform, divided 
into 7 committees created for the preparation of constitutional 
amendments and new laws13.   
Now, during the reform implementation, the International Monitoring 
Operation (IMO), established by the Annex of the constitutional 
amendments of 2016, is actively working. This body is composed of judges 
                                                 
12 See: High level experts of the Justice reform; available at:  
http://www.reformanedrejtesi.al/ekspertet.  
13 Of the 24 high-level experts, 1/3 of them were experts from international organizations 
from the EU Euralius Mission, the US OPDAT mission, the Council of Europe (Venice 
Commission) and the OSCE-ODHIR. The 7 commissions established for drafting laws 










Aurela Anastasi  
7 
and prosecutors as representatives of Albania’s international partners, 
from the EU and the USA.  It was doing the monitoring of the competent 
bodies for the vetting process, the reevaluation of the judges and 
prosecutors, which are the Commission, the Court, and the public 
commissioners. 
There are various cases in Balkan countries where international assistance 
is mandated by law, setting up bodies and their competences during the 
implementation of this reform. Discussing this issue, the Special 
Parliamentary Commission for the Judicial Reform in Albania paid 
attention to the experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The 
commission stressed that “the level of participation of international observers and 
monitors has achieved even the executive competencies”14. However, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo had special political and social conditions, 
because of the post-war crises. In this case of a particular need, the special 
attention of international factors is understandable. In Kosovo, for 
instance, the Independent Commission of Judiciary and Prosecutors was 
established as a temporary body in 2009 to reevaluate the judges and 
prosecutors, headed by independent international leaders. At the 
beginning, this commission was composed of only international members, 
but later, many judges and prosecutors in Kosovo, who passed the 
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evaluation process became members of the commission15. The country 
does not have the same conditions as Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. However, “The involvement of the international community in this process 
is constitutionally foreseen - it was considered crucial for the credibility of the process by 
the Albanian legislator”16.  
There has been criticism regarding the establishment of this body. For 
example, among the political government factors within Albania, the 
following opinion was expressed: “In relation to the provision under article 
…which reads that the testing is carried out under the oversight of the European 
Commission, we wish to draw your attention to the fact that the process of assessing the 
qualifications of the incumbents is the responsibility of domestic institutions. As 
Albania aspires to EU membership, we need to demonstrate that our institutions are 
fully capable of carrying out such responsibilities”17. Even the Venice Commission 
has raised concerns about the impossibility of the Albanian Constitution 
to guarantee the existence and well-functioning of this mechanism, 
because that is dependent on the international members’ goodwill. “In 
addition, the existence and proper functioning of this mechanism will depend on the good 
will of foreign powers and international organizations, and this is not something which 
                                                 
15 Independence of the Judiciary in Kosovo: Institutional and Functional Dimensions, “Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe” MISSION IN KOSOVO, January 2012, pg. 
14, available at: https://www.osce.org/kosovo/87138?download=true 
16 See: Most frequently asked questions on the International Monitoring Operation, available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania/20144/most-frequently-asked-questions-
international-monitoring-operation_en  
17 See: Executive Summary of the Justice Reform by the Socialist Movement for Integration, available 
at: http://www.euralius.eu/images/Justice-Reform/Propozimet-e-LSI-per-Ref-
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a national Constitution may guarantee”18. According to the interim Opinion of 
the Venice Commission, “It is most unusual for a national Constitution to 
introduce in the constitutional system of checks and balances a figure or an organism 
which is nominated from outside the country, and which is ultimately responsible not 
before the democratically elected bodies within the country but before a foreign government 
or an international organization”19.  
In frame of these concerns, it would be reasonable to examine the 
functions and competencies of this body. The IMO has two essential 
features: consulting and technical professional expertise. Practically, the 
IMO has set up an effective group of international judges and prosecutors, 
who monitor and offer professional expertise for the independent vetting 
bodies. Thus, the IMO does not represent any external political or 
decision-making body, which could interfere with the political power or 
in the balance issues between powers. These facts are proven even from 
the means with which the IMO exercises its functions and competencies. 
Theoretically, it seems to be a case of the cross-judicial fertilization 
phenomenon. It sounds like a type of constitutional diplomacy. In 
addition to these reasons, I think this body was called by the Albanian 
Constitution as an international guarantee for the progress of the vetting 
process and the reform of the judicial system. In the framework of this 
body, experienced international observers can support a strict process, 
                                                 
18 See: CDL-AD(2015) 045, Venice Commission, “Interim Opinion on the draft 
constitutional amendment on the judiciary of Albania”; available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2015)045-e, paragraph130; 
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free from corruption and political intervention. In addition, it is very 
important to implement this formula carefully, with respect to 
international standards, the due process of law, privacy and other human 
rights for judges, prosecutors and all other vetting subjects. However, the 
IMO should perform its tasks within the framework of international 
agreements in force. Therefore, the IMO remains an international body 
from the outside, which is more in keeping with its monitoring role, 
impartial and trustworthy. If this body had been integrated in the Albanian 
constitutional bodies, it would lose its performance for which it was called 
from the public and the framers. It is not the first time that the Albanian 
Constitution calls for a guarantee by international bodies. The IMO simply 
can be ranked amongst the international bodies mentioned explicitly or 
implicitly in the Albanian constitution20. 
 
 
3. The mechanisms strengthening the independence of the 
justice system.  
Analyzing the constitutional mechanisms within a narrow perspective is 
important for the reform process. This perspective includes the new 
bodies that are set up and changes in existing bodies. For example, a 
                                                 
20 For this issue see: Anastasi, Aurela, Reforming the Justice System in the Western 
Balkans. Constitutional Concerns and Guarantees (June 19, 2018). Workshop No. 18, of 
the 10th World Congress of Constitutional Law (IACL-AIDC); 2018 SEOUL 18-22 June 
2018, Available at: 
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possible classification can be found in the Albanian justice reform analysis, 
by Richard Albert and co-authors21. Based on this classification, we can 
divide the institutional changes into three groups: reforming existing 
institutions, creating new institutions, and transitioning institutions for 
reform purposes. Other classifications are stated in various reports by 
national and international organizations,22 which are based on 
classification of institutions by their content and by their impact on judicial 
power. However, these findings are not exhaustive. 
Making a comparative analysis, we observe that, in general, the 
mechanisms established by the reforms are not completely new. Most 
continue to function in countries that are now members of EU, such as 
Rumania, Bulgaria and Croatia. A common measure was the reform that 
strengthened the independence and the effectiveness of the organs of the 
judicial government, such as the High Judicial Council and the High 
Prosecutor Council. In addition, reform mechanisms related to the status, 
integrity and the accountability of judges are included23. The challenge is 
how to make them work effectively and to stabilize the judiciary in these 
countries.  
                                                 
21See: Richard Albert & others, Constitutional Reform in Brazil: Lessons from Albania? Boston 
College Law School, legal studies research paper series, research paper 453 May 1, 2017, 
available at: file:///C:/Users/anastaau.BC/Downloads/SSRN-id2960734.pdf  
22 See Anti-Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of Southeast Europe, cited.  
23 In this framework, the 2016 amendments of the Albanian Constitution, of the 2013 
Montenegro constitution, and the 2018 draft amendment of the Serbian constitution, are 
compared. See also: Anti-Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of Southeast Europe, cited, footnote 
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One of the methods implemented in the reform was reorganization of the 
government bodies of the justice system. Thus, the high judicial and 
prosecutor councils, which in some countries are separated into two 
organs (the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutor Council) were 
strengthened24. There was a change in their composition, as well as in the 
procedures and the appointments to the bodies. The goal was to increase 
the effectiveness and their independence in decision making.  
Another feature of the reform was removal of the role of minister of 
justice in these bodies. In the past, the minister of justice played an active 
role. The position was considered a means of balance between powers, 
against corporatism in judicial government bodies. However, the minister 
lost this position. In Albania, the minister of justice is no longer a member 
of the High Council of Justice or a member of the High Prosecutor 
Council25. The 2013 constitutional changes in Montenegro foresaw the 
minister responsible for judicial issues as an ex officcio member of the High 
Council of Justice, but the minister cannot be its head26. In Serbia, the 
minister of justice is no longer a member of the High Council of Justice 
but can be a member of the High Prosecutor Council27. Perhaps, these 
reactions of new reform of the justice system reflect the problems caused 
                                                 
24 The Western Balkans there is in place separate councils as High Judicial Councils and 
High Prosecutor Council.  
25 The Amendment of the Constitution of Albania no.76/2016, available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
REF(2016)064-e, art.147 and 149;  
26 Anti-Corruption Reloaded: Assessment of Southeast Europe, cited, pg.71 
27 See: Draft amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, amendment XII 
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by political interference in judicial bodies, which is considered an 
encroachment on judiciary independence28. The minister’s participation in 
these bodies should have been one of the most effective mechanisms of 
control against corporatism among judiciary bodies and judges. It does not 
seem to have happened, and the causes should be analyzed. However, this 
is related to the incapability of the political instruments in these 
transitional democratic countries, in which the state activity is very 
politicized. Thus, this mechanism was not able to fulfill this important 
mission.  
As long as there is not a more appropriate formula for the balance and 
control of judicial government bodies, lay members from outside remain 
necessary to neutralize the corporatism of judges and prosecutors. 
Analyzing the measures taken by the justice reforms, we notice that these 
countries resolved this issue through the plural composition of these 
bodies, including prominent lawyers from outside the system. In Albania, 
based on the new amendments of the Constitution in 2016, the two 
government councils for judges and prosecutors are composed of 11 
members. Six members are elected by judges and prosecutors of all levels 
of the courts, while five are elected by the Parliament from other lawyers 
and academics. Based on this draft amendment, the number of judges is 
equal to that of the lay members in the two government bodies. The 
composition of the High Council of Justice and of the High Prosecutor 
Council in Kosovo represents an example of pluralism. However, because 
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of the historical and social development of the country, these bodies have 
some differences, which are reflected in the quotas for minorities and the 
membership of international missions. There is a consolidated opinion 
that “this parity between judicial and lay members would avoid both the risk of 
politicization and the risk of self-perpetuating government of judges”29. This point has 
been emphasized many times by the Venice Commission, but other 
factors impact the success of this formula. First, this plurality should be 
real. For example, in Serbia, the Venice Commission has emphasized that 
the appointments of the High Judicial Council members create a deceptive 
pluralism.30 Further, another important factor is represented by the 
procedures and bodies for selecting and appointing members. While, 
based on these reasons, the Albanian formula that provides that the 
majority of members should be elected by the judiciary, it seems to be 
weaker, except in cases where the law seeks a qualified majority in 
decision-making. In addition, in all the Western Balkan countries in the 
European integration process, the search for a new constitutional balance 
                                                 
29 See: CDL (2012)051-e; Draft Opinion on two sets of draft amendments to the 
constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary of Montenegro. Paragraph 20; available 
at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2012)051-e  
30“By contrast, the composition of the High Judicial Council seems flawed. At first sight, the composition 
seems pluralistic. There are 11 members...This appearance of pluralism is, however, deceptive. All these 
members are elected, directly or indirectly, by the National Assembly… The six judges are not to be 
elected by their peers but by the National Assembly, the lawyer not by the Bar Association but by the 
National Assembly, the professor not by the law faculty but by the National Assembly. The judicial 
appointment process is thus doubly under the control of the National Assembly: the proposals are made 
by the High Judicial Council elected by the National Assembly and the decisions are then made by the 
National Assembly itself. This seems a recipe for politicization of the judiciary and therefore the provisions 
should be substantially amended” CDL-AD(2007)004 -Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, 
available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
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is creating a common formula for the High Judicial Councils, the so-called 
European model of judicial councils: “There are five approaches to judicial 
administration known today, which are the model of the Ministry of Justice; the judicial 
council model; the courts service model; the hybrid model and the socialist model”31. 
Thus, what are the guaranties that the lay members can protect against 
politization and corporatism on judicial government bodies? It is difficult 
to find a response for all the countries. However, there is the experience 
of Montenegro, where the plurality of the structure is estimated as a 
possibility of having a more professional and less politicized body. “Thus, 
on the one hand, having in mind this rearrangement of the structure of the Judicial 
Council, it could be expected that appointments and dismissals of judges would be more 
professionalized and less politicized”32. Therefore, monitoring of its 
effectiveness is needed for Albania, to find the right conclusions and 
lessons that should be learned.  
New formulas for the status and appointment of judges are other relevant 
mechanisms for strengthening judicial independence. There are deep 
changes in the constitution aiming at the transparency of the selecting, 
nominating and appointing processes for judges or other officials of the 
justice system. However, implementing the new formulas offered by the 
reforms is a challenge, because the current experience has shown that the 
progress of the appointment of judges and/or other judicial authorities 
                                                 
31 See: Denis Preshova & others, “The effectiveness of the ‘European model’ of judicial independence 
in the western Balkans: judicial councils as a solution or a new cause of concern for judicial reforms”, 
Centre for the law of EU external relations, CLEER PAPERS 2017/1. 
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has depended on parliamentary will or that of other nomination bodies, 
which, in most cases, are subordinated to the political opportunity.  
 
 
4. Accountability mechanisms for judges and prosecutors.  
This was a strategic goal of the judicial reform. “Instead, creating 
mechanisms for and ensuring judicial accountability, has emerged as a 
most pressing issue, as the newly gained independence of the judiciary was 
not matched by putting in place an adequate mechanism for 
accountability. As a result, observers have noted an increase, rather than a 
decrease, of corruption in transition countries’ judiciary in the 1990s, as 
judges now had a larger say and more discretion within the economy”33. 
In this framework, judges’ and prosecutors’ immunity from the criminal 
process, as well as the mechanisms of their disciplinary liability, was 
subject to constitutional changes. Thus, the reforms have restricted or 
removed judges’ immunity from the criminal process and have 
consolidated their immunity related to the function. Judges’ immunity has 
been removed in Kosovo and Albania34. However, protection from arrest 
through authorization of the corresponding councils remains in other 
countries. This mechanism was adopted in the 2013 reform in 
                                                 
33 Supra, fq. 82.  
34 The Constitution of the Republic of Albania as amended in 2016, supra, note 27, article 
137 and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, available at:  
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5. Specialized courts.  
The establishment of specialized courts and prosecutor offices for 
investigating and prosecuting corruption cases involving senior state 
officials is also one of the most important measures in the reforms. In 
Albania, these bodies are provided by a constitutional amendment (no. 
76/2016), while in other cases these bodies are mandated by law. Even 
those mechanisms are not new because similar bodies were created in 
other countries, which are now new members of the European Union. 
One of the most prominent bodies is the anti-corruption agency in Croatia 
(USKOK)36. However, not every country in Southeast Europe has 
established specialized courts. “Most SELDI37 countries have found no reason 
for creating specialized courts dealing with corruption; they apply the general criminal 
procedure to it. Some have specialized prosecutions and courts for organized crime38. 
The specialized courts are more effective for fighting corruption at high 
official levels. Ordinary courts have often avoided punishing high-level 
                                                 
35 Draft amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, amendment XII and 
XXVI, available in:  http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
REF(2018)015-e  
36 Shih: Mission Report of Euralius, available at: 
http://www.euralius.eu/annexes3pr/Annex%20152%20USKOK%20Mission%20Rep
ort%20EN%202016%2004%201.pdf  
37 SELDI (Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity). 
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corruption, statistically reporting the judgments of corruption cases for 
low-level officials.  
 
 
6. Temporary measures. The vetting processes. 
The reevaluation and reappointment of judges and prosecutors as a 
temporary measure are several of the most radical measures in the judicial 
reform. The aim is to establish a new reevaluation method, different from 
the periodic evaluation of judges and prosecutors, that functions in the 
full system, within a short period of time and gives faster results39.  
 
 
7. The new judicial culture.  
Several provisions of the laws approved in the frame of justice reform in 
Albania aimed at detaching political influence from the judiciary are 
currently provided for in the Constitution and especially in the laws on the 
organization of the judiciary and the status of judges. However, their 
successful implementation depends not only on formal sanctions, but also 
on judicial culture. There are plenty of cases where culture dominates 
beyond formal rules. This tendency is confirmed in Albania, but also in 
other countries of the world. We also need to discuss the “European 
judicial culture”, which is an increasingly hot topic thanks to judicial 
reforms that have been carried out in many EU and non-EU countries. 
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However, this is a very broad discussion and we will briefly focus on some 
aspects that help us better understand the “judicial culture” in the context 
of implementing the justice reform. Firstly, the “judicial culture” is a 
theoretical concept. The analysis and generalization of its content is a 
contribution of university departments to the development of justice. John 
Bell's definition helps us understand the essence, as it is a very broad 
concept. According to him, “judicial culture” includes “characteristics that 
form the way in which the work of a judge is evaluated within specific legal systems.” 
The greatest contribution that theorists can make to the development of 
judicial culture is precisely the exchange of best cultural experiences in 
relation to these characteristics, in order to establish a good judicial 
culture. Just like legal culture in general, judicial culture also faces anti-
cultural elements. Thus, although the justice reform was able to raise the 
whole public opinion against corruption in the judiciary, cases of 
corruption in its ranks have been identified during the most intensive years 
of its implementation, while simultaneously many judges and prosecutors 
were being dismissed. This means that public enthusiasm is not enough, 
not only because an anti-corruption culture in the judiciary has not yet 
been formed, but also because the anti-cultural elements are very resilient.  
Let us illustrate this with an example. I.e., the law “On the organization 
and functioning of the Constitutional Court” explicitly provides for 
disciplinary liability of judges in case they do not notify the President of 
the Court or the competent bodies of interference or other forms of 
inappropriate influence by political officials. However, compliance with 
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these interventions. If we browse the tradition of the Albanian judiciary in 
these 30 years, we notice that such behavior is not part of the judicial 
culture. To this date we have not encountered any case where a judge has 
denounced or simply reported inappropriate interference coming from 
any political official, or from any senior official of the country. We can 
similarly conclude on many other provisions provided in the organic laws. 
For example, a judge of the Constitutional Court bears disciplinary 
responsibility in case he intervenes and exercises inappropriate influence 
towards his colleague, i.e. another judge. To this date, we have never 
registered any reports on such cases. In these circumstances, we agree that 
the establishment of these provisions in law is not a consequence of 
practical need, since such practices have not existed at all in our judicial 
culture. However, they are important mechanisms to guarantee the 
independence and impartiality of the judge and the court. Therefore, we 
expect that the mandatory implementation of these provisions will create 
a new judicial culture, where judges report interference by the politics or 
by fellow colleagues. The more we delve into these issues, the more we 
realize that constitutional and legal mechanisms are very important to 
guarantee the independence and impartiality of the court. This is clearly 
stated in the opinions of the Venice Commission regarding the justice 
reform, as well as in the decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
for “Xhoxhaj versus Albania”.  
Constitutional amendments and laws on the justice reform have 
established a number of mechanisms aimed at an independent and 
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depends on several factors, among which the very important judicial 
culture. Thus, for instance, although the justice reform found formulas 
that limited the power of political bodies to appoint judges, it did not 
completely sever their participation in the appointment. This does not 
mean unconstitutionality. On the contrary, in many democracies political 
bodies participate in the appointment of judges, acting as balancing 
powers. However, I would like to put forward the need to create a new 
culture of relations between judges and bodies that have appointed them. 
Among other things, the so-called “culture of ingratitude” has attracted 
my attention. When I refer to the ingratitude towards the political body 
that has selected and appointed the incumbent judge, I mean the 
professional attitude of the judge and distancing when the bodies that 
appointed him intervene to resolve court cases or when they become 
parties to the trial themselves. For example, the decision of the Assembly 
to dismiss the President of the Republic is awaiting trial by the newly 
composed Constitutional Court. The concern raised in this case is related 
to the fact that currently, all newly appointed judges in the Constitutional 
Court have been selected by the President of the Republic and the 
Assembly; both of them being subjects of this constitutional judgment. 
However, judges shall not use methods of favorable judgment and 
reasoning or hold positions that express their gratitude to the bodies that 
have appointed them. This culture consists in respecting the principle of 
impartial trial, which is a legal obligation.  
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that we expect the 
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Albanian judicial culture, reforming it on a sound basis in the framework 




8. Conclusion.  
The main issue of the justice reform is to reform the judiciary into an 
independent system free of corruption and political pressure in order to 
win the public’s trust.  This reform cannot meet all public expectations, 
but it is important to insist on having a judiciary that will discover and 
punish corruption even at high official levels. International support is 
welcomed as a constitutional guarantor. There is a “Western Balkans 
model” of judicial reform of the countries undergoing European 
integration, which is part of the “European Union model”.  There is a lack 
of doctrinal analysis in this field, which has remained a domain of non-
government organization (NGO) reports. However, theoretical analysis 
and a new “reform reasoning” would be very helpful. 
